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ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE
LEON 11. WALLACE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

As a general proposition, the courts of both England and the
United States agree that a transfer of a tenant's entire interest
in the premises is an assignment, not a sublease, and that the
transferee is substituted as the tenant of the landlord in place
of the transferor. 1 Conversely, a transfer of an estate in the
premises less than that which the transferor himself has, with a
reversion left in him, is not an assignment, but a sublease, making the transferee the tenant of the fransferor.2 The fact that
*

Of the Terre Haute Bar.

1Sheridan v. Doherty, (1919)

106 Wash. 561, 181 Pac. 16; Hogg v.
Reynolds, (1901) 61 Neb. 758, 86 N. W. 479, 87 Am. St. Rep. 522; Meyer
o. Beyer, (1906) 43 Wash. 368, 86 Pac. 661; CapitalBrewing Co. v. Crosbie,
(1900) 22 Wash. 269, 60 Pac. 632; Hollywood v. First Parish, (1906) 192
Mass. 269, 78 N. E. 124; Holder v. Tidwell, (1913) 37 Okla. 553, 133 Pac.
54; Craig v. Summers, (1891) 47 Minn. 189, 49 N. W. 742, 15 L. R. A.
236; Doty v. Heth, (1876) 52 Miss. 532; Stewart v. Long Island R. Co.,
(1886) 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200, 55 Am. Rep. 844; Normile v. Martell,
(1928) 95 Pa. Super. 139; Forrest v. Durnell, (1894) 86 Tex. 647, 26 S. W.
481; St. Joseph and S. L. R. Co. v. St. Louis, L M. and S. R. Co., (1890)
135 Mo. 173, 36 S. W. 602, 33 L. R. A. 607; Ferri v. Taylor, (1922) 196
N. Y. S. 857, 203 App. Div. 719; Cook v. Jones, (1894) 96 Ky. 283, 28 S. W.
960; Mulligan v. Hollingsworth, (1900) 99 Fed. 216; Poe v. Silver, (1932)
134 Kans. 803, 8 Pac. (2) 945; see also McLennan v. Grant, (1894) 8 Wash.
603, 36 Pac. 682 (where terms are uncertain); Tiffany, Landlord and
Tenant, I, (1912) pp. 905-918; Tiffany, Real Property, I, (1920) No. 55,
pp. 170 if. For other articles on related topics, see 37 Harv. L. Rev. 630
(1924); 34 Yale L. J. 913 (1924); 23 Mich. L. Rev. 211, 308 (1925); 19
Ill. L. Rev. 602 (1925) ; see also T. A. D. Jones Co. v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., (1932) 55 Fed. (2) 944; 8 Ore. L. Rev. 86 (1929); for English cases, see post, sees. 9-22; see also note, 7 Ann. Cas. 737.
2 Derby v. Taylor, (1801) 1 East. 502, 102 Engl. Repr. 193; Woodhull
v. Rosenthal, (1875) 61 N. Y. 382; Stewart v. Long Island R. Co., (1886)
102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200, 55 Am. Rep. 844; Geer v. Zinc, (1907) 126 Mo.
App. 173, 103 S. W. 151; Doty v. Heth, (1876) 52 Miss. 530; Mayhew V.
Hardesty, (1855) 8 Md. 479; Wheeler v. Hill, (1839) 16 Me. 329; Schenkel
v. Rischinsky, (1904) 45 Misc. 423, 90 N. Y. S. 300; see also Barnes v.
Standard Oil Co. of Calif., (1932) 9 Pac. (2) 1095 (Wash.); Bruce Coal
Co. v. Bibby, (1927) 201 Ala. 121, 77 So. 545. So if a tenant for years
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the interest transferred is of a duration but slightly less than
the interest of the tenant is immaterial. 3
Unfortunately, these basic principles, so firmly intrenched, so
unfailingly reiterated in our law, are applied, especially in this
country, only to the most obvious and simple situations. Thus
there is complete accord that when a lessee leases his estate
under exactly the same terms, and with the duties of the subtenant running to the original lessor, an assignment has been
effected.4 Likewise, if he leases to the sub-tenant for only a
fraction of the remainder of the term, a sublease has been
effected.5 The distinction is important. An assignee is in
privity of estate with the lessor, and consequently has the benefit of and is directly liable to the lessor on all covenants in the
lease which run with the land.6 He is not liable to the lessee
unless the lessee has been held by the lessor to account for a
breach of the covenants by the assignee. 7 A sublessee, however,
is liable only to the lessee according to the terms of the sublease,
and does not come in privity of estate with the lessor.3 The diffilets to another who holds at will, it is a sublease. Austin v. Thomson,
(1863) 45 N. H. 113; Cross v. Upson, (1864) 17 Wis. 638. So if one with
a term of a year or more lets to hold from year to year. Austin v. Thomson, (1863) 45 N. H. 113; Peirse v. Sharr, (1828) 2 Man. & R. 418. And
a tenant from year to year, having a possibility of a term of indefinite
duration, creates a sublease when he leases to one for years. Oxley v.
James, (1844) 13 Mees. & W. 209, 153 Engl. Repr. 86; or to one to hold
from year to year. Curtis v. Wheeler, (1830) 1 Moody & M. 493, 173 Engl.
Repr. 1235; Pike v. Eyre, (1829) 9 Barn. & C. 909, 109 Engl. Repr. 338;
see also 20 Col. L. Rev. 95 (1920).
3 See Crusoe v. Bugby, (1771) 3 Wils. 234, 95 Engl. Repr. 1030; Van
Rensselaer v. Gallup, (1848) 5 Denio (N. Y.) 454; Sexton v. Chicago
Storage Co., (1889) 129 Ill. 318, 21 N. E. 920, 16 Am. St. Rep. 274.
4 See supra, note 1; see also 20 Col. L. Rev. 94 (1920); 29 Yale L. J.
568 (1920); 37 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1924).
5 See supra, note 2.
6 See Stewart v. Long Island R. Co., (1886) 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200,
55 Am. Rep. 844; Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., (1889) 129 fll. 318, 21
N. E. 920, 16 Am. St. Rep. 274; note, 52 L. R. A. (n. s.) 968, 979; note,
Ann. Cas. 1916 E 788, 797; 16 R. C. L. 848, 849; 1 Minn. L. Rev. 357, 359
(1917); 8 Minn. L. Rev.609 (1924).
7 Farringtonv. Kimball, (1879) 126 Mass. 313, 30 Am. Rep. 680; note,
52 L. R. A. (n. s.) 968, 978; note, Ann. Cas. 1916 E 788, 820. See also
Bonetti v. Treat, (1891) 91 Calif. 223, 27 Pac. 612, 14 L. R. A. 151; Bronson v. Kramer, (1901) 135 Calif. 36, 66 Pac. 979; Henne v. Summers,
(1914) 23 Calif. App. 763, 139 Pac. 907.
8 Tiffany, Real Property, I, (1920) No. 54, No. 55, pp. 159-174; Dunlap
v. Bullard, (1881) 131 Mass. 161; Davis v. Vidal, (1912) 105 Tex. 444,
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culty is: What have the courts regarded as a sufficient retention
to constitute a reversionary estate? To answer this, it will be

necessary to analyze the situation on the basis of what the courts
have done, instead of accepting altogether what they have incidentally said.
II.

THE ENGLISH AUTHOITIES

The effect of an instrument in form and intent a sublease, but

for a term covering a remainder of the original term, seems to
have been questioned for the first time in a nisi prius case, 9 in
which it was held that if the lessee reserves the rent to himself

or granting over, it is an underlease, and not an assignment,
though he parts with the whole term.

Shortly after, 10 an in-

strument, inadmissible in evidence as a lease, because unstamped,
was admitted as a declaration of trust, and not as a lease, because nothing was "reserved" to the lessor. Almost a century
later," Parke observed that Poultney v. Holmes12 was a doubtful
authority, and advised the parties to settle; but during this same

period, in four different cases,13 it was held that the lessee who
had sublet for the remainder of the term, or his representatives,

might recover the rent reserved in the sublease. In two of the
cases' 4 the action was by one to whom the lessee, after subletting, had assigned his rights under the sublease. The actions,

being in the name of the assignee, would not have been sus151 S. W. 290, 42 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1084; note, Ann. Cas. 1916 E 788, 823;
note, 52 L. R. A. (n. s.) 968, 976.
9 Poultney v. Holmes, (1721) 1 Str. 405, 93 Engl. Repr. 596 (an action
of trespass against the lessee for a term of years, who after letting orally
to the plaintiff for the remainder of his term, which was one and threequarters years, re-entered). Adopted, Baker v. Gostling, (1834) 1 Bing.
(N. C.) 18, 246, 131 Engl. Repr. 1024, 1111. Questioned, Barrett v. Rolph,
(1845) 14 M. & W. 348, 153 Engl. Repr. 509. Sustained, Pollock v. Stacy,
(1847) 9 Q. B. 1033, 115 Engl. Repr. 1570. See Pluck v. Digges, (1831)
5 Bli. N. S. 31, 5 Engl. Repr. 219.
10 Harker v. Birbeck, (1764) 4 Burr. 1556, 1562, 1563, 97 Engl. Rep.
509.
11 Barrett v. Rolph, (1845) 14 M. & W. 348, 153 Engl. Repr. 509.
12 (1721) 1 Str. 405, 93 Engl. Repr. 596.
:3 Baker v. Gostling, (1834) 1 Bing. (N. C.) 19, 246, 131 Engl. Repr.
1024, 1111; Clarke v. Coughlan, (1841) 3 Ir. L. R. 427; Pollack v. Stacy,
(1847) 9 Q. B. 1033, 105 Engl. Repr. 1570; Williams v. Hayward, (1860)
1 El. & El. 1040, 120 Engl. Repr. 1200. See note 9, supra.
14 Clarke v. Coughlan, (1841) 3 Ir. L. R. 427; Williams v. Hayward,
(1860) 1 El. & El. 1040, 120 Engl. Repr. 1200.
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tainable if the demands had been merely choses in action. The
judges construed the cause of action to be "rent," even though a
reversion was absent; since it was "rent," it was not affected by
the rule forbidding assignment of a chose in action. It should
be noted, however, that the judges in these cases clearly regarded "rent" as something different than a "reversionary
interest."
There is, likewise, a decision 15 that the lessee who had "subleased" for a term coextensive with his own was entitled to
re-enter for a breach of condition on a power of re-entry contained in the sublease given by him. The court observed that
the absence of reversion was no objection, b~cause it was analogous to the feoffment in fee rendering rent. It may be urged that
these cases are not of necessity in conflict with the principle
that a "sublease" for the residue of a term is an assignment,
because the defendant in each of these cases was liable for rent
to the original lessee by virtue of his express covenants, in spite
of the fact that he occupied the position of assignee. The case
of Pollack v. Stacy,' however, cannot be disposed of by that
argument.
However, there are decisions which reveal the other side of
the picture presented by the foregoing cases. It was held 17 that
one deriving title from the sublessee for the residue of the term
is entitled, as an assignee of the original lessee, to hold the original lessor for breach of covenants in the initial lease. Likewise,1 8 a sublessee for the residue of the term is liable to the
original lessor for rent reserved by the original lessee, and an
assignee of a lessee1 9 is not liable to the original lessor on the
covenants of a lease after the lessee has made a lease for the
15 Doe J. Freeman v. Bateman, (1818) 2 B. & Ald. 168, 106 Engl. Repr.

328. Approved, Hyde v. Warden, (1877) 3 Ex. D. 84.
v. Hall, (1863) 14 Ir. C. L. 265.
16 See note 13, supra.
17 Palmer v. Edwapds, (1783)

Affirmed, Colville

1 Doug. 187, n., 99 Engl. Repr. 122, B.
R. E. 23 Geo. 3, 99 Engl. Repr. 630.
18 Wollaston v. Hakewill, (1841) 3 Man. & G. 297, 133 Engl. Repr. 1157.
Adopted, Beardman v. Wilson, (1868) L. R. 4 C. P. 59; Rendall v. Andreae,
(1892) 61 L. J. Q. B. 630. In these cases a new rent had been reserved in
the sublease. See also Clayson v. Leech, (1889) 61 L. T. (n. s.) 69, 41 Ch.
D. 103. See also Lord Llangattock v. Watney Combe, (1910) 1 K. B. 236.
19 Beardman v. Wilson, (1868) L. R. 4 C. P. 58; see note 18, supra.
Accord, Lewis v. Baker, (1905) 1 Ch. 46. See also Hallen v. Speath, (1923)
A. C. 684; Cottee v. Richardson, (1851) 7 Exch. 143 (reservation of new
rent).
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remainder of his term, because the transaction amounted to an
assignment. Nor does mere reservation of the same rent constitute a revision. 20 A sublease for a period co-extensive with,
or longer than, the sublessor's term operates as an assignment. 21
And if a lessee grants for more than the length of his term,
reserving rent, an assignment has been effected, and it is doubtful whether such assignor would have any remedies for recover22
ing the rent.
In passing, it should be noted that the English courts never
considered the possibility of (1) reservation of a different rent
to the sublessor, (2) reservation of right of surrender at end of
term, (3) reservation of right of reentry, or (4) any other
rights such as are ordinarily reserved in a lease, being a reversionary estate sufficient to effect a sublease as to the head
3
lessor.2
It is evident from the review of the English cases that there
are actually two groups of holdings:
(1) in one group the sublessee is liable to the original lessee;24
(2) in the other group the sublessee is liable to the original
2
lessor. 5
Therefore, whether the sublessee intended to or not, he has
undertaken a double liability, and even though the original
lessor may recover the rent from him, nevertheless the original
lessor may have his action, and the first recovery would seem
to be no bar.26 Nor have the English courts ever hinted that
20Pascoe v. Pascoe, (1837) 3 Bing. (N. C.) 898, 6 L. J. C. P. 322, 132
Engl. Repr. 656. See Jolly v. Arbuthnot, (1859) 4 De G. & J. 224, 45 Engl.
Repr. 87; Hooker v. Rye, (1834) 1 Cr. M. & R. 258, 149 Engl. Repr. 1077.
21 Lewis v'. Baker, (1905) 1 Ch. 46, 74 L. J. Ch. 39, 91 L. T. (n. s.)
744, 21 T. L. R. 17; Parmenterv. Webber, (1818) 8 Taunt. 593, 129 Engl.
Repr. 515; see also Bisset & Co. v. Hammond, (1921) 2 Extraterr. Cas. 89.
22 Langford v. Selmes, (1857) 3 K. & J. 220, 3 Jur. N. S. 859, 69 E. R.
1089. See also Bryant v. Hancock & Co., Ltd., (1898) 1 Q. B. 716. See
post, note 27.
23 See notes 18, 19, 20, and 21, supra, as to rent; see notes 15 and 17
as to right of re-entry. See also Thorn v. Woolcombe, (1832) 3 Barn. &
Adol. 586, 110 Engl. Repr. 213; Selby v. Robinson, (1788) 15 N. C. C. P.
370, 2 T. R. 758, 100 Engl. Repr. 409.
24 See notes 13, 14, 15 and 16, supra.
25 See notes 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22, supra.
26 As between the lessee and sublessee, the relation of landlord and
tenant may exist. Pollock v. Stacey, (1847) 9 Q. B. 1033, 115 Engl. Repr.
1570; Poultney v. Holmes, (1721) 1 Str. 405, 93 Engl. Repr. 596. And as
between lessor and sublessee, the sublease is held to operate as an assignment. Wollaston v. Hakewill, (1841) 3 Man. & G. 297, 322, 133 Engl.
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any agreement by the original lessee to pay the rent due on the
original lease would be implied, as has been done in the United
States.2 7 The only protection to the sublessee is that the original

lessor cannot collect from him if he, the original lessor, has collected from the original lessee.
Why did these latter cases 28 hold that the sublease operated as
an assignment? The court reasoned that the sublessee holds of
the revisioner, and not of the lessee, because there can be no
such thing as tenure between the owner of the term for years
and one who has transferred it. Thus a "privity" is established
between the sublessee and the reversioner. The intent of the
parties therefore has no effect, unless it be reasoned that the sublessee has been allowed to assume all the duties which the parties
intended, plus the duties which the law would have imposed.
However, as to the real intent, the courts have ignored it, as
witness the cases where there was a condition with a right of re29
entry on breach thereof reserved.
Inconsistent with the theory of the first group of cases cited,3 0
is a group of cases 3 ' denying to the original lessee the privileges
granted by certain statutes in favor of landlords to collect rent,
although regarding the parties as occupying the landlord-tenant
relation as far as a civil action by the lessee against the sublessee. In short, these cases uphold the view that a lease of the
Repr. 1157. See Beardman v. Wilson, (1868) L. R. 4 C. P. 57. It seems
probable that if the lessor were paid, the amount paid might be deducted
from that due the lessee. See Wollaston v. Hakewill, supra. But, if the
lessee has been paid, since the transaction operated as an assignment, that
should be no defense to an action by the lessor against the sublessee.
27 People v. Shorb (1878), 14 Hun. (N. Y.) 112. See also Adams v.
*
Beach, (1850) 1 Phila. 99, 7 Leg. Int. 178.
28 See note 25, supra.
29 See note 17, supra.
30 See notes 9-15, incl., supra.
31 Lindon. v. Collins, (1743) Wiles 428, 125 Engl. Repr. 1251; Bulpit v.
Clarke, (1804) 1 Bos. & Pul. 111, 127 Engl. Repr. 379; Rankin v. Newsam,
(1828) 1 Hud. & Br. 70; Fawcett v. Hail, (1832) Al. & Nap. 248; and see
also, Porterv. French, (1846) 9 Ir. L. 514; Jones v. O'Grady, (1850) 13 Ir.
L. 292; Overruling Hogan v. Fitzgerald, (1828) 1 H. & B. 77, n.; Lessee of
Coyne v. Smith, (1826) Batty, 90 n. And see Leominster Canal Co. v. Cowell, (1798) 1 B. & P. 213, 126 Engl. Repr. 865; Smith v. Mapleback, (1786)
1 T. R. 441, 99 Engl. Repr. 1186; Paramenterv. Webber, (1818) 8 Taunt.
593, 129 Engl. Repr. 515; Preece v. Corrie, (1828) 5 Bing. 24, 130 Engl.
Repr. 968 (a lease, and no assignment, but since a demise of the entire interest, lessee had no right to distrain); Pascoe v. Pascoe, (1837) 3 Bing.
(N. C.) 898, 132 Engl. Repr. 656; see note 17, supra; Langford v. Selmes,
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entire interest by a lessee is an assignment, but allow the parties
thereto, by express contract, to set up a sublease as between
themselves; but aside from such agreement, the original lessee
does not have power of ouster.
Likewise, if a tenant for years leased for a period of less
than his own term, and then his reversion and the fee became
united in one person, the rent on the sublease was lost, because
the reversion was gone.
The courts, while declaring this, decried it as an unrighteous defense. Subsequently this phase of
the situation was corrected by statute. 33
The principle of assignment was also upheld in a decision that
an underlessee was not liable for impeachment for waste, because that immunity was set out in a provision of the head
34
lease.
As a result of this review and the cases cited, it may safely
be observed that:
(1)

the weight of English authority favors the view that a
lease by the lessee for the whole of his unexpired term
operates as an assignment, but there has been considerable authority that is, at least, inconsistent with the general principle;
(2) in making some of the decisions cited as authority for the
proposition supported by the majority, the courts themselves have decried that proposition. 35
(1857) 3 K. & J. 220, 69 Engl. Repr. 1089, see note 19, supra; and also
Slough Picture Hall Co. v. Wade, (1916) 32 T. L. R. 542, 544. (A pur-

ported assignment of a lease void as an assignment because not by deed
may be good as a subletting, subject to this, that the sublessor having no

reversion loses his right of distress so far as it depends on the ownership
of the reversion.)

See Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, I, (1912)

No. 151,

at p. 914.
32 Webb v. Russell, (1789) 3 T. R. 393, 100 Engl. Repr. 639; Thorn v.
Woolcombe, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 586, 110 Engl. Repr. 213.
33 Stat. 4 Geo. II, c. 28, s. 6; Cousins v. Phillips, (1865) 3 H. & C. 892,

159 Engl. Repr. 786; Extended to crown lands by Stat. 8 and 9 Vict. c. 99,
s. 7. Effect broadened by Stat. 7 and 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 12, which was shortly
repealed by a more efficient stat. 8 and a Vict. c. 106 (when reversion expectant on a lease * * * shall be surrendered or merged, the estate
* * * shall * * * be deemed the reversion expectant on the same
lease.)
34 Beaumont v. Marquis of Salisbury, (1854) 19 Beav. 198, 52 Engl.

Repr. 525.
35 See Darling in 16 Amer. L. Rev. 16 (1882) for an excellent discussion
of this.
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III.

THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIESSO

In the United States, as in England, the courts have generally
recognized the principle that a reversionary interest in the landlord is essential to effect a sublease.3 7 In this country, we find
two distinct groups of cases, and a new principle, hinted at in
the English cases.

This third principle threatens either to sup-

plant one of the old groups which are based upon technical exceptions, or to form a third group, with a reasonable possibility
of becoming paramount. For the purpose of analysis, the three
classifications are:
1. Nothing short of a reservation of some length of time of
the lessee's (sublessor's) estate will be sufficient to amount to
a reversion, and so effect a sublease.3 8
36 Because of the number of jurisdictions involved, and, except for New
York and Massachusetts, because of the relative isolation of the decisions
within the several jurisdictions, this phase of the review is presented by
a doctrinal, rather than a chronological analysis. The chronology, within
any jurisdiction may be secured easily from the footnotes.
37 See note 2, supra.
38 (a) Cases directly in favor of the proposition, or tending to support
it, are cited.
(1)
(2)

Alabama.
See Johnson v. Moxley, (1927) 113 So. 656.
California.
Smiley v. Van Winkle, (1856) 6 Calif. 606 (rent, right of
re-entry; a short decision merely stating the rule, and citing
no authority); see also Jordanv. Scott, (1918) 38 Cal. App.
739, 177 Pac. 504, and Blumenberg v. Myres, (1867) 32
Calif. 93, 91 Am. Dec. 560 n. But see Backus v. Duffy,
(1930) 284 Pac. 954, post, note 40 (a). See also Williams v.
Hinckley, (1930) 293 Pac. 644 (silent on terms of sublease).

(3) Florida.
C. N. H. F., Inc. v. Eagle Crest Development Co., (1930)
128 So. 844 (Fla.). A reservation of different rent and right
of re-entry is not sufficient to prevent assignment when
entire term is passed.
(4) Illinois
Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., (1889) 129 Ill. 318, 21 N. E.
920, 16 Amer. St. Rep. 274; Taylor v. Marshall, (1912) 255
Ill. 545, 99 N. E. 638. These cases expressly repudiate the
contention that a reservation of anything less than a part
of the term is sufficient to prevent an assignment.
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(5) Indiana.
IndianapolisMfg. and Carpenters Union v. Cleveland, C., C.
& St. L. R. Co., (1873) 45 Ind. 281 (rent); Liebschutz v.
Moore, (1880) 70 Ind. 142 (parties called grant a sublease,
reserving rent to lessee, but with stipulation for surrender
to head lessor). But see Indian Refining Co. v. Roberts,
(1932) 181 N. E. 283.
(6)

Kentucky.
See Cook v. Jones, (1894) 96 Ky. 283, 28 S. W. 960, 29 L. R.
A. 92, post; note 39 (c) and comment.

(7) Maine.
For discussion, see City of Waterville v. Kelleher, (1928)
141 Atl. 70 (neither assignment nor sublease).
(8) Michigan.
See Lee v. Payne, (1856) 4 Mich. 106; but see note 39 (c),
post; see also Fratcher v. Smith, (1895) 104 Mich. 537, 62
N. W. 832 (language not necessary to decision, however).
(9)

Minnesota.
Cameron-Tobin Baking Co. v. Tobin, (1908) 104 Minn. 333,
116 N. W. 838 (rent, right of re-entry, surrender); Craig
v. Summers, (1891) 47 Minn. 189, 49 N. W. 742, 15 L. R. A.
236 (right of re-entry); Ohio Iron Co. v. Auburn Iron Co.,
(1896) 64 Minn. 404, 67 N. W. 221 (rent, right of re-entry) ;
Davidson v. Minnesota Loan and Trust Co., (1924) 158
Minn. 411, 197 N. W. 833, 32 A. L. R. 1418 (rent, surrender,
right of re-entry; good digest of cases). These cases expressly hold that only a reservation of a part of the term
itself is sufficient to effect a sublease, and repudiate reservation of rent and rights of re-entry.

(10) Missouri.
See St. Joseph & St. L. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 1. M. & S. R.
Co., (1896) 135 Mo. 173, 36 S. W. 602, 33 L. R. A. 607 (written intent of parties will not control; here instrument called
a sublease was held to be really an operating contract).
(11) New Jersey.
Firthv. Rowe, (1895) 53 N. J. Eq. 520, 32 Atl. 1064 (rent);
but see Wilson v. Cornbrooks, (1927) 6 N. J. Misc. 614, 137
Atl. 819, post, note 40 (e) ; see Wilson v. Corabrooks, (1928)
140 Atl. 292.
(12) New York.
See Gillette Bros., Inc. v. Aristocrat Restaurant,Inc., (1924)
239 N. Y. 87, 145 N. E. 748, and see also Herzig v. Blumenkrohn, (1907) 122 App. Div. 756, 107 N. Y. S. 570; Stewart
v. Long Island R. Co., (1886) 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200, 55
Am. Rep. 844. See also Midway Hotel Co. v. Belleclaire Syndicate, (1930) 246 N. Y. S. 155, 138 Misc. Rep. 401.
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(13) Oklahoma.
See Holden v. Tidwell, (1913) 37 Okla. 553, 133 Pac. 54.
(14) Texas.
See Campbell v. Cates, (1899) 51 S. W. 268; see also Davis
v. First National Bank of El Paso, (1924) 258 S. W. 241
(here nothing was reserved, and the only intent manifested
was the fact that the instrument was termed a "sublease";
held, an assignment. But see Davis v. Vidal, (1912) 105
Tex. 444, 151 S. W. 290, 29 L. R. A. 92, post, note 40 (f),
where the question of reservation was in issue).
(15) United States.
See Mulligan v. Hollingsworth, (1900) 99 Fed. 216 (lease
extended beyond term is assignment). In re Bayle, (1909)
177 Fed. 522.
(16) Washington.
Weander v. Claussen Brewing Ass'n., (1906) 42 Wash. 226,
84 Pac. 735, 7 Ann. Cas. 536, 114 Amer. St. Rep. 110 (right
of re-entry; held, nothing less than part of the term will
amount to a reversion, even as between the parties); Sheridan v. Doherty, (1919) 106 Wash. 561, 181 Pac. 16 (right
of re-entry; here the term of the sublease was greater than
the lessee's term); see also MoLennan v. Grant, (1894) 8
Wash. 603, 36 Pac. 682 (where terms are uncertain). Cf.
Barnes v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., (1932) 9 Pac. (2)
1096.
(b) A covenant not to assign is not enough to create a reversionary
interest. Spear v. Fuller, (1835) 8 N. H. 174i Shattuck v. Lovejoy, (1857) 74 Mass. 204; of. Fanum v. Heffner, (1889) 79
Calif, 575, 21 Pac. 955. (As to the effects of such covenants
where there is an assignment, see People's Bank v. Mitchell,
(1878) 73 N. Y. 406; Butler v. Manny, (1873) 52 Mo. 497; 36
Harv. L. Rev. 624 (1923). Contra, University Club v. Deakin,
(1914) 265 I1. 257, 106 N. E. 790. See 7 Am. L. Rev. 240 (1872).
(c) Transfer of the entire term in a part of the leasehold is an assignment. Cox v. Fenwick, (1817) 7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 538; Cook
v. Jones, (1894) 96 Ky. 283, 28 S. W. 960; Cities Service Oil Co.
v. Taylor, (1932) 45 S. W. (2) 1039 (Ky.); Hollywood v. First
Parish, (1906) 192 Mass. 269, 78 N. E. 124; Hogg v. Reynolds,
(1901) 61 Neb. 758, 86 N. W. 479, 87 Am. St. Rep. 522; Lee v.
Payne, (1853) 4 Mich. 106; Harris v. Frank, (1876) 52 Miss.
155; Stover v. Chasse (1894) 6 Misc. 394, 26 N. Y. S. 740; Dartmouth, College v. Clough, (1835) 8 N. H. 22; Den d. Lunsford
v. Alexander, (1838) 20 N. C. (3 Dev. & B. Law) 166; Gulf, C.
& S. F. R. Co. v. Settegast, (1891) 79 Tex. 256, 15 S. W. 228; Pingrey v. Watkins, (1843) 15 Vt. 479; Ellis v. Bradbury, (1888)
75 Calif. 234, 17 Pac. 3; Babcock v. Scoville, (1870) 56 Ill. 461;
Hockersmith v. Sullivan, (1912) 71 Wash. 244, 128 Pac. 222.
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2. Even though the entire term is granted, a reservation of
the following incidents, frequently reserved in leases, will be
sufficient to effect a sublease (if the parties so intended?) :
(1) A covenant to surrender, or specifically, to surrender on
the last day of the sublease, which is also the last day of

head lease. 39
All these cases are sometimes cited as authority for the major
proposition for this footnote. It is submitted that, with two exceptions, they are not exactly in point for the proposition for
which they are cited. The lessee made an outright sale of all he
had, reserving nothing, but the sublessee failed to realize that
he acquired only what the sublessor had, which included a duty
to pay rent to the head lessor. There was no intent to create a
sublease. The exceptions are Cook v. Jones, supra, and Hockersmitk v. Sullivan, supra,where the lessee reserved rent.
39 (To assist understanding, all cases which also include one or more of
the other exceptions are starred, and those in which the entire reversionary
interest is the proposition for which they are cited are marked thus 1.)

(a) Iowa.
Collamer v. Kelley,* (1861) 12 Iowa 319, 323. (A different rent
was also involved here. It is doubtful whether the statement on
the sublease question was necessary (or possible) in view of the
decision.)
(b) Massachusetts.
Dunlap v. Bullard,* (1881) 131 Mass. 161. (Reservations of
rent, right of re-entry were also involved. This court emphasized the covenant to surrender.)
(c) New York.
Piggott v. Mason,* (1829) 1 Paige (N. Y.) 412. (The covenant
to surrender is implied by lessee's (sublessor's) right to refuse
permission to remove buildings at end of term, and his right to
renew lease with heaed lessor in his own name; in fact, surrender before the end of the term of the head lease would be
necessary so the building could be removed.) Post v. Kearney,$
(1849) 2 Comst. (N. Y.) 394. (There was something akin to a
possibility of reverter here in the covenant to surrender if and
when the buildings were burned, but the court did not seem to
consider this.) Martin v. O'Connor,* (1865) 43 Barb. (N. Y.)
514. (This also included rent and right of re-entry); Collins V.
Hasbrouck,* (1874) 56 N. Y. 157 ( the court made some general
statement not necessary to the decision); Ganson v. Tifft,* (1877)
71 N. Y. 48; Schumer v. Murwitz,* (1905) 96 N. Y. S. 1026. (The
court here assumed that the surrender by the sublessee would
leave a fragment of a day in the sublessor.) Phelan v. Kennedy,*
(1919) 173 N. Y. S. 687; of. Woodhull v. Rosenthal, (1875) 61
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(2) A reservation of a right to re-entry for breach of condition. 40
N. Y. 382. (The court held that this case did not come within
rule of Post v. Kearney, supra, because the covenant was not to
surrender to the sublessor specifically.) But there is an assignment if there is a covenant to surrender to the lessee at the same
moment of time that he was bound to surrender to the lessor;
here the court could not assume that the sublessee was to surrender sometime during the day. Herzig v. Blumenkrohn, (1907)
122 App. Div. 756, 107 N. Y. S. 570. See also Keteltas v. Coleman, (1854) 2 E. D. Smith, 408. (A covenant not to assign is
not violated by letting for the whole term with provision for
surrender on last day); see also 20 Col. L. Rev. 95 (1920).
40 (a) California.
Kendis v. Cohn, (1928) 265 Pac. 844; Backus v. Duffy,* (1930)
284 Pac. 954. (This case cannot be reconciled with Smiley v.
Van Winkle, (1856) 6 Calif. 606, supra, note 38 (a) (2).
(b) Massachusetts.
Dunlap v. Bullard,* (1881) 131 Mass. 161 (see note 39 (b),
supra). Essex Lunch v. Boston Lunch Co.,$ (1918) 229 Mass.
557, 118 N. E. 899. (The court talked in terms of something
akin to a possibility of reverter, and regarded this in itself as a
sufficient reversionary interest.)
(c) Michigan.
Fratcher v. Smith,* (1895) 104 Mich. 537, 62 N. W. 832. (The
statements on sublease were not necessary to the decision of the
issues raised.)
(d) Montana.
Saling v. Flesch&,$ (1929) 277 Pac. 612. (Rent also was reserved,
but the decision was based entirely on the right of re-entry. The
court observed that the intention of the parties will govern.
However, the language applies here only to the relation of the
lessee and sublessee. The case of Wilson v. Cornbrooks, (1927)
6 N. J. Misc. 614, 137 AtI. 819, was relied on heavily; unfortunately that case had been reversed before this decision was
rendered.)
(e) New Jersey.
Wilson v. Cornbrooks,$ (1927) 6 N. J. Misc. 614, 137 Atl. 819.
(The decision is directly in point for the proposition. However,
this decision was reversed by the Court of Errors and Appeals,
(1928) 140 Atl. 292.)
(f) New York.
Martin v. O'Conner,* (1865) 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 514. (A covenant for different rent and one to surrender were also considered.) Collins v. Hasbrouck,* (1874) 56 N. Y. 157 (see note
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(3) A reservation of rent different from that in the head

lease. 41
39 (c), supra); Ganson v. Tifft,* (1877) 71 N. Y. 48; Koppel v.
Tilyou,* (1900) 31 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 185, 70 N. Y. S. 910;
Schumer v. Hurwitz,* (1905) 49 Misc. 121, 96 N. Y. S. 1026;
Phelan v. Kennedy,* (1919) 173 N. Y. S. 687. And see Linden
v. Hepburn, (1850) 5 N. Y. Super. Ct. (3 Sandf.) 668. But see
also Gillette Bros., Inc. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, Inc.,* (1924)

239 N. Y. 87, 145 N. E. 748.
(g) Texas.
Davis v. Vidal, (1912) 105 Tex. 444, 151 S. W. 290, 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1084, and note.
41

(a) Iowa.
Collamer v. Kelley,* (1881) 12 Iowa 319 (see note 39 (a), supra).
(b) Massachusetts.
Dunlap v. Bullard,* (1881)

131 Mass. 161 (see note 39 (b),

supra).
(e) New York.
Piggott v. Mason,* (1829) 1 Paige (N. Y.) 412 (the court emphasized the reservation of new rent); Martin v. O'Conner,*
(1865) 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 514; Collins v. Hasbrouck,* (1874) 56
N. Y. 157 (see note 39 (c), supra). For cases sometimes cited
contra but easily distinguishable, see Bedford v. Terhune, (1864)
30 N. Y. 453, 27 How. Prac. 422, 86 Am. Dec. 394 (merely holds
that even though called a sublease, if none of the exceptions ar,!
reserved, it is an assignment; underlessee paid rent to the head
lessor); accord, Acker v. Witherall, (1843) 4 Hill 112. Likewise when one is in possession, in the absence of satisfactory
proof of other facts, an assignment is presumed. Quackenboss
v. Clarke, (1834) 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 555; Armstrong v. Wheeler,
(1828) 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 88; Williams v. Woodward, (1829) 2
Wend. (N. Y.) 487. And see In re Tennbaum v. Arbramowitz,
(1931) 56 F. (2) 217; Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Bank of
American Nat. Ass'n, (1932) 256 N. Y. S. 406, 143 Misc. Rep.
365. But see Gillette Bros., Inc. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, Inc.,
(1924) 239 N. Y. 87, 145 N. E. 748. And see Midway Hotel Co.
v. Belleclaire Syndicate, (1930) 246 N. Y. S. 155, 138 Misc. Rep.
401. (Landlord may proceed for rent reserved in lease against
subtenant of entire remaining term, though different rent was
contracted for by subtenant.)
(d) New Jersey.
Wilson v. Cornbrooks, (1927) 6 N. J. Misc. 614, 137 Atl. 819;
this decision was reversed, however, in (1928), 140 Atl. 292.
(e) Oklahoma.
See Baptist General Convention v. Wright, (1929) 276 Pac. 777.
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(4) Other new covenants, not contained in the head lease,
which are advantageous to the lessee (sublessor).42
(5) A granting of only a physical portion of the original
leasehold, without regard to any of the above exceptions.
(f)

43

Pennsylvania.
Drake v. Lacoe,* (1893) 157 Pac. 17, 27 Atl. 538, 25 L. R. A.
349. (Held that assignment for increased consideration with new
stipulations, with right of re-entry for conditions broken, with
an express assumption of continuing liability of the assignors
to the owners under the original lease, and a manifest intention
to sublet, not only is not evidence of intention to end the privity
of estate between lessor and lessee, but is an express reaffirmance
of it.) McLaren v. Citizens' Oil & Gas Co.,* (1900) 14 Pa.
Super. Ct. 167.

(g)

Texas.
H. L. Null & Co. v. J. S. Garlington & Co.,* (1922) 242 S. W.
507. (Here was also a covenant that in case of default in any
of the other covenants, the sublessee could enforce performance
in any of the modes provided by law.)

(h)

United States.
United States v. Hickey,$ (1872) 17 Wall. (U. S.) 9, 13, 21 L.
Ed. 59. (The statement of the court was not necessary to the decision of the question involved.)

42 Piggott v. Mason,* (1829) 1 Paige (N. Y.) 412; McLaren v. Citizen's
Oil & Gas Co., (1900) 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 167. See also Post v. Kearney,
(1849) 2 Comst. (N. Y.) 394. A number of other cases also involve other
covenants, but the courts did not seem to give them serious consideration.
And see H. L. Null & Co. v. J. S. Garlington & Co.,* (1922) 242 S. W. 507.
See also Webb v. Jones, (1927) 263 Pac. 538 (Calif.). Lessee made conditional sale of lease reserving title.
43

(a)

Massachusetts.
Patton v. Deshon, (1854) 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 325 (a vague and
unsatisfactory decision); McNeill v. Kendall, (1880) 128 Mass.
245, 35 Am. Rep. 373 (here the lessee, in transferring his leasehold estate in part of the premises for the residue of the term,
by an instrument in form a sublease, also granted easements in
the part retained by him; the court held in effect that because,
on the conveyance of one parcel, as appurtenant thereto, easements in another parcel are granted, the whole interest in the
premises conveyed is not disposed of. The reasoning is unsatisfactory, and purports to be based on Pattonv. Deshon, supra.

(b) Michigan.
Fratcherv. Smith,* (1895) 104 Mich. 537, 62 N. W. 832, 29 L.
R. A. 92. (Here a different rent was reserved; dictum.)
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(6) A combination of two, or more, of the above mentioned
44
exceptions.
(c) New York.
Koppel v. Tilyou,* (1900) 31 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 185, 70 N. Y. S.
910. See Midway Hotel Co. v. Belleclair Syndicate, Inc., (1930)
246 N. Y. S. 155, 138 Misc. Rep. 401.
(d) Ohio.
Fulton v. Stuart, (1825) 2 Ohio 215, 15 Am. Dec. 542, and note.
(No intent on part of sublessor here to reserve anything.)
(e) Washington.
Shannon v. Grindstaff, (1895) 11 Wash. 536, 40 Pac. 123.
44

(a) Iowa.
Collamer v. Kelley, (1861) 12 Iowa 319 (rent, surrender).
note 39 (a), supra.)

(See

(b) Massachusetts.
Dunlapv. Bullard, (1881) 131 Mass. 161 (rent, right of re-entry,
surrender). See note 39 (b), supra,
(c) Michigan.
Fratcherv. Smith, (1895) 104 Mich. 537, 62 N. W. 832 (rent,
portion granted.) (See note 38 (a), supra.)
(d) New York.
Piggot v. Mason, (1829) 1 Paige (N. Y.) 412 (rent, right of reentry, different covenants); Martin v. O'Conner, (1865) 43
Barb. (N. Y.) 514 (rent, right of re-entry, surrender) ; Collins
v. Hasbrouck, (1874) 56 N. Y. 157 (rent, right of re-entry, surrender); Ganson v. Tifft, (1877) 71 N. Y. 48 (right of re-entry,
surrender); Koppel v. Tilyou, (1900) 31 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 185,
70 N. Y. S. 910 (rent, right of re-entry, portion granted); Schumer v. Hurwitz, (1905) 49 Misc. Rep. 121, 96 N. Y. S. 1026
(right of re-entry, surrender); Phelan v. Kennedy, (1919) 173
N. Y. S. 687 (right of re-entry, surrender). For comments on
these cases, see notes 39 (c), 40 (f) and 41 (c), supra. But
where the term of the sublease extended beyond the original
term, the sublease was held to operate as an assignment, although
it contained reservations of rent, right of re-entry and surrender.
Stewart v. Long Island R. Co., (1886) 102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E.
200, 55 Am. Rep. 844. See also Gillette Bros., Inc. v. Aristocrat
Restaurant, (1924) 239 N. Y. 87, 145 N. E. 748.
(e) Pennsylvania.
Drake v. Lacoe, (1893) 157 Pac. 17, 27 Atl. 538, 23 L. R. A. 349.
See note 41 (c), supra. McLaren v. Citizens' Oil & Gas Co.,
(1900) 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 167 (rent, other different covenants).
(f) Texas.
H. L. Null & Co. v. J. S. Garlington & Co., (1922) 242 S. W.
507 (Tex.). See note 41 (g), supra.
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(7) A power of cancellation by the lessee (sublessor) 45 creating in the sublessor an executory interest akin to a
possibility of reverter.
3. The manifested intention of the parties will govern, so
long as that adds no hazard to the rights of the head lessor.46
Before proceeding to the analysis of the American variations
from the strict rule which are grouped under sections 2 and 3

of the above classification, it seems advisable to mention the
question of the possible double liability of the sublessee, already
discussed in the review of the English authorities. In American
cases holding an attempted sublease an assignment, there are
frequent dicta that, as between the lessee and the sublessee, the
relation of landlord and tenant may exist. 47 It seems doubtful
whether the courts would hold the sublessee for double liability,

where the head lessor has been paid by him. At least three cases
are authority that the amount paid could, apparently, be deducted from the amount due to the lessee.4 8 However, the writer
was unable to find any decisions in a situation where neither the
lessee nor sublessee had paid the lessor. The mere liability to

the lessor should not be available to the sublessee as a defense
in an action by the lessee for the rent, because the lessor may
4;

(a)

Indiana.
Indian Refining Co. v. Roberts, (1932) 181 N. E. 283.

46 Cf. Herzig v. Blumenkrohn, (1907) 107. N. Y. S. 570, 122 App. Div.
756 with the holdings in other New York cases in note 39 (c); Drake v.
Lacoe, (1893) 157 Pa. 17, 27 AtI. 538, 25 L R. A. 349, note 41 (c), supra;
see also Frithv. Wright, (1915) 173 S. W. 453, and Saling v. Flesch, (1929)
277 Pac. 612 (Mont.).
47
Stewart v. Long Island R. Co., (1886) 102 N. Y. 601, 607, 8 N. E.
200, 55 Am. Rep. 844; Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., (1889) 129 Iln. 318,
21 N. E. 920, 16 Am. St. Rep. 274; Craig v. Summers, (1891) 47 Minn.
189, 192, 49 N. W. 742, 15 L. R. A. 236. Contra, Weander v. Claussen
Brewing Ass'n, (1906) 42 Wis. 226, 84 Pac. 735, 7 Ann. Cas. 536, 114 Am.
St. Rep. 110; Mansert v. Christian Fregenspar, (1905) 68 N. J. Eq. 671,
64 Atl. 801; see also Frith v. Wright, (1915) 173 S. W. 453 (Tex.), and
Saling v. Flesch, (1929) 277 Pac. 612 (Mont.); Nunnally Co. v. Bromberg
& Co., (1928) 115 So. 230 (Ala.); Baptist General Convention v. Wright,
(1929) 136 Okla. 150, 276 Pac. 777. See also note 7 Ann. Cas. 537 et seq.,
and 34 Yale L. J. 913 (1924).
48People v. Shorb, (1878) 14 Hun. (N. Y.) 112; see also, Adams v.
Beach, (1850) 1 Phila. 99, 7 Leg. Int. 178; Potts-Thompson Liquor Co. v.
Potts, (1868) 135 Ga. 451, 459, 69 S. E. 734.
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elect to hold the lessee. 49 But if the rent is paid to the lessee,
it would certainly destroy the effect of an assignment if such
payment to the lessee were a defense to the subsequent action
by the lessor for the payment of the rent reserved in the head
lease.
IV.

REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN VARIATIoNS 5 0

A study of the exceptions which have been regarded by American courts as sufficient reversionary interest to prevent an assignment being effected reveals a distinction never used by the
English authorities, never contemplated by the common law. If
a comparison must be made, these cases 5' have inclined more
toward the principle of Baker v. Gostling5 2 and Pollack v. Stacey 5 3 (where it was held that the lessee who had sublet for the
remainder of his term might recover the rent reserved in the sublease) than to that of Beardman v. Wilson54 (where it was held
an assignee of a lessee was not liable to the original lessor on
the covenants of a lease, after the lessee had made a lease for
the remainder of his term, because the transaction amounted to
an assignment). Inevitably, this leads to the question: Are
these exceptions valid in the light of reason, and in the light of
the law laid down by the same courts when these incidents are
involved in some other question of the law of real property? The
exceptions will be discussed in order:
(1)

A covenant to surrenderas a reversionaryestate.

As pointed out before, 55 the courts have held that a covenant
to surrender is a sufficient reversionary estate in land. However, the same courts have held that an attempt to lease for
49 The lessee remains liable to the lessor for the rent reserved in the
original lease although the lease has been assignd. See 16 R. C. L. 845;

note, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 968, 971; note, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 788; Tiffany,
Landlord and Tenant, I, (1912), § 151, at p. 915.
50 A discussion of the merits of the rule itself, which the cases in note 38

supra, support, will be made in Section V. This section is devoted to the
exceptions introduced by the American courts and supported by the cases

cited in notes 39-45, inc., supra.
51 Cases cited in notes 39-45, inc., supra.
52 See note 13, supra.
53 See note 13, supra.
54 See note 19, supra.
55 See note 41, supra.
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longer than the lessee's term would constitute an assignment. 56
The difficulty with the general proposition stated here is that the
sublessee need not surrender until the same instant of time when
the lessee is bound to surrender to his head lessor, with the
result that nothing of the original term remains in the lessee.
However, the New York courts have assumed that the parties
to the sublease intended that a fragment of a day be left in the
sublessor, and when the parties have made it impossible for this
assumption to be made, the courts have declared an assignment.5 7 Other courts using this exception usually cite the New
York cases. If this assumption is true, there is, of course, a
reservation of part of the term, but the assumption is usually
questionable, if not outright fictitious. If the sublessee is bound
to surrender sooner, all courts would agree that a sublease had
been effected. Again, no court, as far as the writer could find,
has ever regarded such a covenant in itself as an estate in land;
by its very nature, it is generally bound up with other reservations, and is regarded as a chose in action and "though it may
give a right in personain against the transferee for breach of
such covenant, it cannot well divest58the property right otherwise
vested in him for the whole term.
(2)

A reservationof a right of re-entry for breach of condition
as a reversionaryestate.

The courts have likewise held that a reservation of a right of
re-entry for breach of condition is a sufficient reversionary estate
in land to prevent the effecting of an assignment. 59 Ordinarily,
however, a right of re-entry is regarded as a chose in action and
56 See Burns' R. S. 1926, (Ind.) § 13415. Conveyances of Greater Estate
by Tenant For Life or Years. "A conveyance made by a tenant for life or

years, purporting to grant or convey a greater estate than he possessed,
or could lawfully convey, shall not work a forfeiture of his estate, but shall

pass to the grantee or alienee all the estate which the tenant could lawfully
convey." It is submitted that, in the light of this statute, if the rule were to
be applied in Indiana, the attempt to convey more than the lessee had would
make no difference, because he could only convey what he had, which would
bring the case back within the exception.
57 See discussion in Herzig v. Blumenkrohn, (1907) 122 App. Div. 756,
107 N. Y. S. 570.
58 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, I, (1912), § 151, at p. 913.
59 See note 40, supra.
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not a reservation of any part of the original term,6 0 nor does it
depend on a reversionary interest in the lessee. 6 1 Certainly, at
common law, rights of re-entry for breach and rights of reverter
were not regarded as estates in land. In fact, their assignment
or devise was expressly prohibited. The reason for this is lost
in the obscurity which affects the entire question of assignment
of choses in action under the early law. 62 Whether or not the
rule should be abandoned for lack of present necessity is not a
question to be discussed here. The fact remains that the rule
persists, except where it has been expressly changed by statute.
And even where the rule as to assignability and devisability has
been changed by statute, the right of re-entry or of reverter is
not regarded as an estate in land. For almost a century, such
rights have been assignable and devisable in England,63 but the
English courts have never considered such rights as an estate in
deciding cases which involve them.64 Most states now have
statutes making contingent reminders and future executory interests as freely devisable and assignable as vested estates. 65
In some states, these statutes have expressly included rights of
60 See Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., (1889) 129 fl1. 319, 21 N. E. 920,
16 Am. St. Rep. 274. See also Craig v. Summers, (1891) 47 Minn. 189, 49
N. W. 742, 15 L. R. A. 236; note, 7 Ann. Cas. 537, 540; Gray, Rule Against
Perpetuities, (2nd), sec. 31 (1895); Walsh, Future Estates in New York,
(1931), sec. 39, pp. 236 ff. See also 3 Minn. L. Rev. 320, 334. When enforced the grantor is in through a breach of condition and not by the reverter. Schulenberg v. Harriman, (1874) 21 Wall. (U. S.) 44, 22 L. Ed.
551; Hooper v. Cummings, (1858) 45 Me. 359; Southard v. Central R. Co.,
(1856) 26 N. J. L. 13.
61 Contra, Cameron-Tobin Baking Co. v. Tobin, (1908) 104 Minn. 333,
116 N. W. 838. See also Ohio Iron Co. v. Auburn Iron Co., (1896) 64 Minn.
404, 67 N. W. 221. But these cases are expressly overruled in Davidson v.
Minnesota Loan and Trust Co., (1924) 158 Minn. 411, 197 N. W. 833.
62 Ames, Disseisen of Chattels, 3 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist.,
584, et seq. The courts have followed Coke (a Co. Litt. 214 a), attributing
the rule to champerty and maintenance. But the rule is older than chainperty and maintenance. The real reason was, probably, the inability of
early law to conceive of the transfer of rights without a transfer of the
thing in respect to which they existed. The rule persists, although the reasons have long ceased to have any force. See 13 Minn. L. Rev. 271 (1929);
see also 8 Col. L. Rev. 142 (1908).
63 8 and 9 Vict. cr. 106, § 6 (1843), and 1 Vict. ch. 26, § 3, (1837) allow-

ing assignment before and after breach.
64 See Sect. II, supra.
65 Walsh, Future Estates in New York, (1913), § 13, p. 61 et seq.
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re-entry and of reverter. 6 6 In the absence of such statutes it is
generally held, as in New York, that they cannot be assigned,
conveyed or devised, following the common law rule.6 7 Here is
an anomalous situation when the same jurisdictions which have
held a right of re-entry to be a sufficient reversionary interest to
prevent an assignment have consistently held that it is not a
reversionary interest at all in every other situation where the
question was involved. It is possible that this inconsistency has
been recognized by at least one of the courts which had fostered
it."" The Indiana court in a recent case 69 was logical and consistent in rejecting the right of re-entry as a reversionary estate
in view of the Indiana attitude toward such rights.7O
1

(3)

A reservationof rent different from that in the head lease
as a reversionaryestate.

Several courts have held that a reservation of rent by the
original lessee is a sufficient reversionary interest to prevent an
66 For the effect of these statutes, see Bouvier v. Baltimore & N. Y. R.
Co., (1902) 67 N. J. L. 281, 51 AtL 781 (construed as applying to assignments before breach). See also Hoyt v. Ketcham, (1886) 54 Conn. 60, 5
Atl. 606; Los Angeles and Arizona Land Co. v. Marr, (1921) 187 Calif.
126, 200 Pac. 1051; and 37 Yale L. J. 530 (1928).

67 Village v. Keithley, (1921) 299 Ill. 247, 132 N. E. 532; Hooper v.
Cummings, (1858) 45 Me. 359; Nicell v. New York & E. R. Co., (1854)
12 N. Y. 131; Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359. See
Salamanca Trust Co. v. Grouse, (1927) 222 N. Y. S. 83, 85-86; Trustees v.
Venable, (1896) 159 Ill. 215, 42 N. E. 836; Methodist Church v. Young,
(1902) 130 N. C. 8, 40 S. E. 691; Contra, Irby v. Smith, (1917) 147 Ga.
329, 98 S. E. 877. It has even been held that a conveyance of the interest
of the grantor not only does not pass it, but destroys it. Berenbrouck v.
Hospital, (1897) 48 N. Y. S. 363; Oakland County v. Mack, (1928) 220 N.
W. (Mich.) 801; Rice v. Boston & W. Ry., (1866) 12 Allen (Mass.) 141.
Wagner v. Wallowa County, (1915) 76 Ore. 453, 148 Pac. 1140. But see
L. R. A. 1916 F 311, annotation. How the assignor can be held to have
parted with a right when it is incapable of assignment, these courts do not
explain. It should be remarked here that Massachusetts holds that a right
of re-entry for breach of a condition is a devisable interest. Austin v. Cambridgeport Parish, (1838) 21 Pick. 215, 223; Brattle Square Church v.
Grant, (1855) 69 Mass. (3 Gray.) 142, 63 Am. Dec. 725.
68 See Gillette Bros., Inc. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, Inc., (1924) 145 N.
E. 748 (N. Y.).
69 Indian Refining Co. v. Roberts, (1932) 181 N. E. 283.
70 See Martin v. Pace, (1841) 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 99; Michael v. Doe ex
dem. Nutting, (1849) 1 Ind. 481; German Mutual Insurance Co. of Indianapolis v. Grim, (1869) 32 Ind. 249, 2 Am. Rep. 341; Steeple v. Downing,
(1878) 60 Ind. 478; see also Buckley v. Taggart, (1878) 62 Ind. 236.
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assignment. 7 1 Rent is not generally regarded as a reversionary
interest. Rent may be reserved upon a conveyance in fee, and
the obligation to pay it will run with the land.7 2 Here again,
some of the same courts holding that a reservation of rent is a
reversionary interest are not consistent with their own decisions.
(4)

Other new covenants as a reversionary estate.

The courts, in general, do not seem seriously to have considered these as sufficient in themselves, and only a few cases have
stressed them, 73 although a number of the courts seem to have
considered the fact of their presence along with one of the foregoing exceptions. The same argument should apply here as has
been applied to the other exceptions. These covenants are, in
all other instances, regarded as choses in actions, and though
they may give a right in personam against the transferee for
breach of such covenants, this would not elevate them to the
position of estates in land.
(5)

A granting of only a physical portion of the original leasehold as reversionaryestate.

This exception 74 seems to have grown out of the confusion of
a few courts between a portion of the premises and a portion of
the term, the latter of which has otherwise always been contemplated, as a review of the cases demonstrates. It is submitted that logically the same rule should apply whether all the
premises are granted or only a portion thereof, whatever the
rule may be.
(6)

A combination of two, or more, of the above exceptions
as a reversionary estate.

If none of the above exceptions is an estate in land, a combination 75 of them should not be unless an accumulation of things
which are not estates in land become estates by sheer cumulative
71 See note 41, supra.
72 Van Rensselaer v. Hays, (1859) 19 N. Y. 68; Tayler v. Heidborn,
(1866) 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 439 (good collection of cases); McMurphy 1v. Minot, (1827) 4 N. H. 251; Alexander v. Warrance, (1852) 17 Mo. 228. See
Scott v. Lunt's Adm'r, (1833) 7 Peters, 596, 8 L. Ed. 797; Adams v. Bucklin, (1828) 7 Pick. 121. See Tiffany, Real Property, II, (1920) sec. 406.
73 See note 42, supra.74 See note 43, supra.

75 See note 44, supra.
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effect. If this is true, it is a new principle in the law of real
property. The only way to give effect to this exception would
be for the court to admit that the intention of the parties was
allowed to govern, and that the cumulative effect was the
strengthening of the evidence as to what that intention was.
(7)

A power of cancellation by tke sublessee as a revisionary
estate creating in the sublessor an executory interest
akin to possibility of reverter.

This is the principle on which a recent Indiana case is based,
the court having logically and consistently rejected the other
exceptions.7 6 This propesition is open to the same objection
that has been voiced before. This is, according to generally accepted notions of legal principles, a power in personam, and not
an estate in land. But, granting the exception, where did the
Indiana court get this power of cancellation in the lessee (sublessor) ? Surely a power in the sublessee to cancel is not a
reversionary estate in the sublessor. While apparently not accepting the contention that the doctrine of mutuality, as applied
in Indiana,7 7 would be pertinent, the court held that since the
lessee had a three-year estate, and the sublessee had a threeyear estate with a power of cancellation (which it exercised),
therefore the lessee must have had something left. The court
reasoned that this created a property interest in the lessee (sublessor) ,-something akin to a possibility of reverter, but which
was, nevertheless, such an executory interest as the law would
recognize. Granting this, the court has given effect, nevertheless, to another ,exception which is open to the same criticism as
those which the court consistently and logically' repudiated. The
court purports to have found a sufficient estate to prevent an
assignment. It is doubtful whether the court would regard it
as an estate if the question arose directly. If anything, it would
seem to be merely an executory interest in property, which may
ripen into an estate. Here again, the court has abandoned the
See Indian Refining Co. v. Roberts, (1932) 181 N. E. 283 (Ind.).
The Supreme Court of Indiana has made some original contributions
to the doctrine of mutuality. Without regard to the merits of these contributions, and realizing that the Appellate Court is bound hereby, it seems
that the Appellate Court was correct, even under the Indiana doctrine, in
refusing, apparently, to apply the doctrine to the case under discussion.
76
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idea of "a reversionary estate" in the sense of reserving a part
of the term.78
What have the courts been doing in these cases? The same
courts which have called these exceptions sufficient reversionary
interest to prevent an assignment have not considered them as
reversionary interests except for this purpose. It seems reasonable to venture that in fact the courts were trying to give effect
to the intention of the parties, without directly saying as much.
Those courts which were logical perforce arrived at the opposite
result. In effect, we find but two rules in the American decisions:
(1) A granting of the entire term is an assignment.
(2) A granting of the entire term is not an assignment if the
parties did not so intend and if this would add no greater
risk to the rights of the head lessor than he already had.
The courts have simply evaded stating the second rule and
have thereby placed other courts in the position either of being
illogical, or of flouting established rules. Apparently none has
wanted to make the direct statement. There is, at least, a strong
tendency to support it, as is testified to by those decisions where
the courts have decided what they believe to be just, and then
sought to justify their decision.
V.

AN INSPECTION OF THE MAJOR PROPOSITION

It seems reasonable to assert that none of the exceptions stand
the test of comparison with the main body of property law. If,
as almost all courts have stated, a reservation of an estate is
necessary, these exceptions must 'fail, unless there is a revision
of the accepted concept of an estate throughout the body of
property law.
If the exceptions fail, nothing is left except the rule itself, the
application of which so many courts have studiously tried to
avoid in order to render substantial justice to all the parties.
If this is to be the result, it seems pertinent to examine this rule
that a reservation of an estate is necessary to effect a sublease
and to defeat an assignment, and to consider the reasons
therefor.
Why have the courts been unable to say that a subtenant may
hold under one who has conveyed his entire term? It is sub78 The court properly rejected the contention that the power of cancellation changed the term for years into one at will. See Brown v. Fowler,
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miffed that the courts have reasoned thus: For a subtenant to
hold under another, there must be privity. There can be no
privity when the sublessor has no estate. Therefore the subtenant must be in privity with the head lessor.
This belief in the necessity of privity, as defined by the ancient
law, has caused the courts to apply a rule which all too frequently achieved a harsh result. The only alternative led to the unsatisfactory exceptions already noted. In the sublease and assignment cases, the courts which have cleaved to the strict rule
have done so under the shadow of privity, used synonomously
with tenure.
In the whole field of property law, is the idea of privity used
with the same strict connotation as it was used in the ancient
days when it signified the relation of tenure? It is submitted
that it is not. In order to dispel the unreasoning respect accorded to privity, it is necessary to digress briefly into other
branches of property law.
The benefits and burdens of the covenants in a lease are transferred on a transfer of the entire term, so that the transferee
in such case occupies the position of assignee, regardless of the
intent of the parties, because, says the common law, privity of
estate or tenure is created between the original lessor and the
sublessee, and therefore they must look to each other for the
performance of the mutual duties incident to the landlord-tenant
relation. 79 The cited case contained an answer and a rebuke to
a note by Serjeant Manning,8 0 who asserted that the intent of
the parties should govern.
Before the Statute of Quia Emptores tenure could be created
on the conveyance of a fee, but that statute halted the practice.
The statute only applied to estates in fee, but the subinfeudation
of lesser estates, at least for a term of years, was not possible
afterwards, because, apparently, it was not allowed before.8 '
(1901) 65 Ohio St. 507; Lindley v. Raydure, (1917) 239 Fed. 928 (citing
a number of cases); Rich v. Doneghey, (1918) 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86;
3 A. L. R. 352; Guffey v. Smith, (1914) 237 U. S. 101, 59 L. Ed. 856.
79 Langford v. Selmes, (1857) 3 K. & J. 220, 3 Jur. N. S. 859, 69 Engl.
Repr. 1089.
80 A note to King v. Wilson, 5 Man. & R. 157.
81 See note to Spencer's Case, Smith's Leading Cases, I, (9th Am. Ed.)
206. "The distinctiori between conveyance by way of subinfeudation and
by way of assignment of estates in fee does not appear to have existed in
the case of lessor estates, or to have been acted upon after the Statute of
Quia Emptores for any purpose relating to lands of socage tenure, until it
was brought back to light in Poultney v. Holmes." See also, 16 Am. L. Rev.
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What part does the principle of privity, or, in its strict sense,
tenure, play in the subject of covenants running with the land?
As a general rule, it is said that in order for covenants to run
with the land, there must be privity between the parties. It is
also said that no covenant which is a burden to the land will
run with it, if such privity is lacking. But rent may be reserved
on a conveyance in fee,8 2 although this is denied in England. 83
The cases deciding this discarded the contention that such a
reservation was subinfeudation. Likewise, in a conveyance of
land by one who retains ownership of an adjoining parcel, covenants may be introduced qualifying the mode of user of the parcel, or imposing on the owner of one piece the performance of
acts for the benefit of the other, which covenants will run with
each parcel,8 4 the benefit with one, the burden with the other.
Here, certainly, there is no privity of estate in the strict common law sense of the term. While the courts still use the same
terms, "privity" has been used to denote a broader concept than
in its original use. In some cases, the courts admit that privity
means tenure, and that there is no tenure between adjoining
proprietors.8 5
The companion proposition to the one that only in case of
privity can covenants run is "that in case of landlord and tenant,
the covenants relating to the estate bind everyone who holds the
estate in privity with the landlord, that is, that the question of
assignment or sublease is to be determined solely by inquiring
whether in each case there would be a feudal tenure between the
86
landlord and the lessee's transferee."
As indicated above, the test of privity, that is, tenure, has been
discredited in one branch of property law, even though the
courts still cling to the old terms. With the passing of the feudal
32, 38 (1882). And see Wood, V. C., in Langford v. Selmes (1857) 3 K. &
J.220, 3 Jur. N. S. 859, 69 Engl. Repr. 1089, 1092.
82 See note 72, supra.
83 See Rawle, Covenants of Title (5th), ch. 10, p. 292; 16 Am. L. Rev.

32, 39.
84

See Tiffany, Real P roperty (2nd) II, § 392, pp. 1412 if., § 303, pp. 1416

if., for collection of cases.
S5 See Burbank v. Pillsbury, (1869) 48 N. H. 475; Rensselaer v. Hayes,
(1859) 19 N. Y. 68; Norfleet v. Cromwell, (1870) 64 N. C. 1. ("The reason

for the rule which founds it on privity of estate is arbitrary, and not a
rule of reason, and may be dismissed as insufficient.") See note 84, supra.
86 See Darling in 16 Amer. L. Rev. 32, 41 (1882). For an excellent treatment of this, see Clark, The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connection
with Real Covenants, 32 Yale L. J.123, 125 (1922).
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system, and with it, the incident of fealty, the old idea was not
necessary, and if strictly applied, would have impeded adjustment to changing conditions. There seems to be no vital reason
why the fiction of feudal tenure should be perpetuated in the
law of assignments and subleases. "We, in the United States
have been readier to subordinate logic to utility. * * * The
development is merely a phase of the assault, now extending
'' 8
along the entire line, upon the ancient citadel of privity. 7
It may be argued that he who has the beneficial enjoyment of
the estate should pay the consideration therefor; but he who
subleases for a single day less than the original term enjoys the
estate while he holds it, and no court denies that such a holding
is a sublease, with no liability to the head lessor, the "overlord."
As to covenants which run with the land, it would seem to be
as reasonable and as satisfactory if they were transferred only
when the totality of interests of the lessee is transferred, rather
than when the term alone is passed, and it would be immaterial
whether this were done by a voluntary conveyance, or by operation of some rule of law. This could be, and as has been pointed
out, is done by a regard of the intention of the parties as manifested by their acts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In an able dissenting opinion,88 it was said, "The characteristic
difference between an assignment of his lease and underletting
by the original tenant resides in the inquiry whether, as a result
of the transaction, the primary lessee has transferred his whole
and entire estate, and completely parted with his title, or has
retained in himself some fragment or shred of his estate, either
substantial or even formal and technical. An underletting implies a constituted relation of landlord and tenant between the
parties contracting and that, in turn, the existence in the land16rd of an estate superior to the leasehold, and out of which the
latter is carved, for there can be no tenure held of one whose
title is utterly destroyed. This rule prevails even over the apparent intention, not because that intention ceases to be the test
and standard of interpretation, but because an impossible intention is never presumed in preference to one possible and
Mr. Justice Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, p. 77.
Finch, J., in Stewart v. Long Island R. Co., (1886) 102 N. Y. 601, 8
N. E. 200, 55 Am. Rep. 844.
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operative between the parties. The rule in its origin under the
feudal system had a substantial and beneficial force. To the
superiorlord a service of fealty was due from the tenant in virtue
of his tenure; and if the lessee could part wit&the whole of his
estate to one holding under him, the service of fealty was gone,
and so, in that case, the new tenant was deemed to hold under
the paramounttitle, as assignee of the lease, put in the place and
room of the original tenant, and bound by his covenants to
render his services. Of course, that useful result has gone out
of the doctrine, and it remains with us simply a rule of legal
logic, much less deserving of the power to override and pervert
the discovered intention of the parties. As a consequence, a
plain tendency to enforce that intention, even upon very narrow
and technical grounds, has been developed. Originally, a reversion in the primary lessee of some fragment of his estate was
needful to support a sublease. It was said that it might be a
day, an hour, or even a minute, but must nevertheless be, and
leave in the primary lessee a reversion having a tangible existence. But that reversion now may be purely technical, and the
product of reasoning rather than of substantial fact. * * *
It is not necessary, however, to say whether the cases in our own
state are in every respect correctly reasoned. It is quite obvious that they mean this, at least: that the contract of the parties construed according to their plain intention as expressed
by it, shall prevail where, upon such construction, that contract
isa possible one, and can be rendered effective in subordination
to establishedlegal rules; and that where a sublease is manifestly
intended, the court will search diligently, and even closely, for
some trace of a reversion to support it."
Perhaps this rule of law does not come within the broad statement concerning outworn rules, of Mr. Justice Holmes.8 9 Under
our system, the law of property should be fixed and certain.
The attempt to perpetuate the statement of the rule that a part
of the term must be reserved in order to prevent an assignment
has not aided that certainty. "Judges have made worthy, if
shamefaced efforts, while giving lip service to the rule, to riddle
it with exceptions and by distinctions reduce it to a shadow.
89 "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule

simply perisists from blind imitation of the past." "The Path of the Law."
Collected Legal Papers,p. 187.
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* * * Timidity and not reverence has postponed the hour
of dissolution." 90 The courts, in arriving at what seem to be
just decisions, have resorted to fictions and presumptions which
the facts of the case did not merit, and the strict statement of
the law did not uphold. Presumptions of intention 91 and "constructive" terms 92 have been liberally used. It does not seem
untoward to suggest that some court should state the rule as it is
practiced, and cease to indulge in indirections which lead to inconsistencies with the main body of property law. Instead of
floundering in terms to avoid a break with the old rule, the
courts, in dealing out the substantial justice which they might
have achieved, might reasonably state the rule to be that which
many of them have made it: So long as no hazards are added
to the rights of the head lessor, a reservationof any interest in
property, estate or otherwise, will be sufficient to defeat an
assignment, if that represents the intent of the parties as manifested by their acts.
90 Mr. Justice Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 155.
91
92

See the New York cases under note 39 (c).
See H. L. Null & Co. v. J. S. Garlington& Co., (1922) 242 S. W. 507

(Tex.).
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